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   Naturalizing, Normativity, and 
Using What “We” Know in Ethics 
Margaret Urban Walker 




The provenance of “naturalized epistemology,” so-called, is too 
recent for the hand of Quine not to be still heavily upon it. But like its 
older relative, “naturalism,” it is an idea rich enough to be coveted, 
and protean enough to be claimed, by diverse comers with different 
things in mind. While Quine’s version of naturalized epistemology of 
science inevitably furnishes the backdrop for current discussion of 
naturalizing moral epistemology, it is important to pause over what 
“naturalized epistemology” can and should mean in ethics. To what 
extent is Quine’s example of an epistemology of science that helps 
itself to science the model for understanding knowledge of and in 
morality? Does it require a view of moral knowledge as reducible to, or 
in a fundamental way furnished by, science? Or a view of moral theory 
as science-like in some way? I argue that the appropriate analogy is 
instead a holistic and reflexive epistemology of morality that helps 
itself to moral judgments and standards seen as answerable to the 
experience of the kinds of shared lives they make possible and 
necessary. This approach neither privileges nor rejects wholesale what 
scientific inquiries might have to say. In the spirit of naturalized 
epistemology, it holds the importance of science to moral 
understanding subject to what else we think we know, including what 
we know morally. 
My aim is to show that there are choices here that are deeply 
enmeshed in views about science, knowledge, and morality. I take 
morality, and hence the object of moral theorizing and moral 
epistemology, to be real-time, culturally embedded practices of 
responsibility. I see moral philosophy as a reflective but (for that 
reason) empirically burdened theoretical practice that is epistemically 
reflexive and normatively critical.1 There is no question here of trying 
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to defend the view as a whole; instead I want to illustrate how it 
exemplifies some features of a naturalized conception, with the effect 
of steering attention in directions that moral philosophers have been 
slow to go, and perhaps resistant to going. 
My specific, interested, and constructive appropriation of 
naturalized epistemology is as loaded as anyone else’s is going to be. 
But this is only “natural,” in the relevant epistemological sense: there 
is no epistemic position outside (a great deal of ) our knowledge. But 
where - that is, on what knowledge - we stand as we seek new 
understanding or revisions in the understanding we possess, and what 
some of “us” think of as “our” knowledge, is a question that must be 
opened. I am going to suggest our response to it should be morally 
and politically self-conscious, as well as epistemologically 
“freewheeling” 
How Quine “Naturalized Epistemology 
In “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine argued that, with the 
failure of reduction programs that promised firm foundations for 
mathematical and scientific knowledge, science might just as well 
explain itself.2 “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into 
place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (EN 
82), whose job is to study the actual construction of a picture of the 
world from scant sensory inputs. Quine is unconcerned about the 
circularity of using empirical science to validate empirical science, 
since there is no alternative knowledge of our knowledge. “We are 
after an understanding of science as an institution or process in the 
world, and we do not intend that understanding to be any better than 
the science which is its object” (EN, 84). 
This move immediately and persistently raised the question 
whether Quine’s naturalized epistemology recaptured the normative 
mission of traditional epistemology to explain what constitutes 
adequate justification and real knowledge. The role of norms in 
scientific knowledge in Quine’s naturalized epistemology is debatable.3 
Quine’s view seems to be that the cognitive equipments of human 
creatures disciplined by “pragmatic” inclinations, like conservatism in 
theory change, simplicity of laws, and of course the ultimate 
“empiricist discipline” of predictive success, are quite good enough. 
Our inquiry into “how it is done” in science will reveal what it is like for 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, (2000): pg. 75-101. Publisher link. This article is © Taylor & Francis and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Taylor & Francis. 
3 
 
it to be done well, for science is our best case of natural knowledge. 
Its practice embodies what is to be done, as well as what is done, in 
this pursuit. 
In the conclusion of another essay from the same period, 
Quine’s triumphal teleology of natural science emerges unabashed. As 
he has it there, in the passage from reliance on our innate similarity 
sense, through intuitive understandings of similarity, and then to the 
scientific definition of theoretical kinds with explanatory significance, 
which need not owe anything to the innate similarity sense, “the 
animal vestige is wholly absorbed in the theory” providing us a 
“paradigm of the evolution of unreason into science.” It is also an 
example of natural knowledge that spurs further knowledge which in 
turn rejects or corrects the original knowledge, or puts it into its newly 
discovered place. Yet this looping process by which what we (think we) 
know is corrected as we go farther on its very basis, has for Quine a 
direction. Even as we “live by bread and basic science both,” it is 
science to which human sapience “rises.” 4 
In naturalized epistemology as Quine first styled it under that 
name, we have the usually remarked elements of holism (the “web of 
belief” vs. foundationalism), fallibilism (any of our previously credited 
beliefs could be found in need of rejection or revision) and naturalism 
(there is knowledge of the world only through its limited sensory 
impacts on us, no knowledge a priori). These together disqualify an 
indefeasibly privileged epistemic position that epistemology as an 
normative tribunal of all knowledges would have to occupy. But there 
is also the scientism, the vision of science as the mature culmination of 
all natural knowledge, science as that knowledge in and of the world 
than which there is not any better.5 This makes science the operative 
normative tribunal for other kinds of knowledge of the world as well as 
all of its own parts (but never, of course, all at once).6 
 
II. The Science Question in Moral Epistemology 
Quine’s founding discussion of naturalizing epistemology 
suggests a certain prototype of that enterprise: a global scientifically 
regimented holism and a particularly scientific naturalism. I argue now 
that this is but one option, and not the best one, for naturalizing moral 
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epistemology. Here is a generic prototype version (NE) of a broadly 
“Quinean” argument for naturalizing the epistemology of scientific 
knowledge. Without vexing the question about Quine’s views, I build 
into this prototype the demand that epistemology have a normative 
dimension. I build this in because I think even philosophers who place 
themselves far distant from the search for foundations of knowledge 
are nonetheless reasonably disinclined to view anything as an 
epistemology that does not issue in at least, to use Hilary Kornblith’s 
generous phrase, “constructive advice on the improvement of our 
epistemic situation.”7 Of course, in a naturalized epistemology, 
normative insight must be compatible with epistemology’s being a kind 
of natural knowledge within the world, available through 
uncontroversial human cognitive capacities; the normative dimension 
must not interject itself from somewhere else, or enter through claims 
to insight prior to or beyond all experience. A normative dimension 
does not require that epistemology introduces some sui generis 
constraints, values, or standards from somewhere outside actual 
epistemic practices of several kinds. It might, for example, reflectively 
retrieve standards immanent in epistemic practices and try to 
understand relations of those standards to the practices themselves 
and to other standards of those practices, as well as to standards of 
other practices. I also use “real knowledge” as a dummy expression 
for whatever conditions for beliefs’ being warranted one wants to plug 
in.8 I am interested in exploring a structural parallel here, and I try to 
leave this schematic prototype extremely general. This will allow us to 
study some options for naturalizing moral epistemology in extremely 
simplified and broad form, as well as to see where the “normative” 
element reappears differently in the case of moral understanding. 
(NE): The epistemology of science seeks to tell us under 
what conditions we have real knowledge of the world. 
So, epistemology must have a normative dimension, its 
inquiries must distinguish conditions under which we are 
likely to have genuine knowledge of the world from those 
under which we have something else (belief that is not 
warranted). 
There is no kind of purely nonempirical knowledge that 
could validate scientific knowledge. 
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There is no empirical knowledge with validity superior to 
scientific knowledge. 
So, there is no kind of knowledge that does not include 
scientific knowledge that can be used to establish the 
validity of scientific knowledge. 
So, the account of how we have real knowledge of the 
world must itself become another application of science, 
i.e. we will have to use (presumptively genuine but always 
in principle fallible and revisable) scientific knowledge (our 
best knowledge and its methods) to explain the conditions 
under which we come to have such a thing as genuine 
scientific knowledge. 
Now let’s explore straightaway one direct extension of this 
prototype for naturalizing epistemology in the case of moral knowledge 
(NME1). 
(NME1) The epistemology of moral knowledge tells us 
under what conditions we have real knowledge of how we 
ought to live. 
Moral epistemology must have a normative dimension, its 
inquiries must distinguish conditions under which we 
have genuine knowledge of how we ought to live from 
those under which we have something else (beliefs about 
how to live that are not warranted). 
Moral knowledge is one kind of knowledge about the 
world (rather than about a transcendent or non-natural 
realm). 
Moral knowledge is knowledge about which 
understandings of how to live are “valid” 
(true/right/acceptable/deserving of authority). 
So, there is no kind of purely nonempirical knowledge 
that could validate moral knowledge. 
There is no kind of empirical knowledge about the world, 
including moral knowledge, with validity superior to 
scientific knowledge. 
There is no kind of knowledge outside of scientific 
knowledge that can better be used to establish the 
validity of moral knowledge. 
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So, the account of how we have real knowledge of how we 
ought to live becomes another application of science. I.e. we will use 
some (presumptively genuine but always in principle fallible and 
revisable) scientific knowledge (our best knowledge and its methods) 
to explain how we come to have such a thing as genuine knowledge of 
how we ought to live. 
I have represented the matter of moral knowledge here under 
the generic idea of “how we ought to live.” I assume this place holder 
can accommodate views with deontological, consequentialist, virtue 
and other elements, so long as these are views about how we ought to 
live. I have for the purposes of this discussion assumed that people 
express, defend, wonder and argue about, and teach their children 
beliefs about how to live, and that the question about moral 
knowledge involves asking whether such beliefs are or could be 
warranted.9 I have included the “naturalistic premise” that moral 
knowledge is a kind of knowledge about this, our actual, world. 
Although a naturalist need not go in for naturalizing epistemology in 
morals or elsewhere, it is hard to imagine anyone interested in 
naturalizing moral epistemology not being some kind of naturalist 
about morality. But the idea that moral knowledge is in and of the 
world is meant in a fairly undemanding sense. It does not imply 
narrower naturalist commitments about moral properties or facts; it 
only suggests, on a parallel with NE above, that such knowledge as we 
may have of how to live is gotten in the world by ordinary cognitive 
capacities from our experiences of the world, which include our 
experiences of living with others and thinking about how we and 
others act and live.10 Finally, I leave open the characterization of the 
validity of beliefs about how to live in order to leave open the 
possibility that multiple ways in which to live might be “validated” by 
inquiries into morality, and that there are different forms that this 
“validation” might take. Again, I think this allows for the structural 
parallel to emerge at a high level of generality. 
This model raises a problem widely associated with scientifically 
naturalized moral epistemology, the “loss of normativity.” Scientific 
theories with explanatory power and predictive value may tell how 
morality arises, is seated in our native capacities, and is transmitted in 
communities with more or less continuity, without being able to say 
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whether any extent forms of morality are morally better or worse than 
others.11 
Naturalized epistemology of science might at least plausibly 
claim to have recaptured epistemology’s normative role from within 
science, to the extent that sciences are successful practices of 
knowledge of how the world in fact is in some respects. In their 
respective domains with respect to the kinds of explanatory and 
predictive powers for which we want that kind of knowledge, sciences 
deliver what we want. We want to know how things work, in particular 
how the structures of things explain how they work; where applicable, 
we hope by knowing how things work to anticipate what they do, and 
make them do what we want them to, and not what we don’t. Well-
developed bodies of scientific theory deliver this, and deliver more of it 
as they are extended and refined. Thus many of us are already as sure 
as we can be (having given up on Cartesian certainty), that we have 
some of what we want and it will pay to follow the patterns by which 
we got it, at least if we want more of that. This is why, except to the 
philosophical skeptic, proposing to vet claims to knowledge by appeal 
to the ways we get such knowledge as science gives does not simply 
jettison the pursuit of norms, but supposes that much of science as 
practiced embodies the relevant norms. That is, the several sciences 
embody such norms as conduce to obtaining the kinds of knowledge at 
which they respectively aim. (And that the norms in play at any given 
time are revisable does not mean that at any given time there are not 
norms.)  
The relevant norms for moral knowledge, however, would have 
to be the ones owing to which moral knowledge delivers what is 
wanted from it. We want moral knowledge in order to know how to 
live. This is what beliefs embodied in actually practiced morality or the 
simplified theoretical constructions of normative moral theory tell us: 
the necessity, importance, or superior value of, for example, human 
dignity, eternal salvation, the greatest happiness, harmony with 
nature, the preservation of natural hierarchies, proper respect for 
ancestors, nonviolence and universal compassion, or more or less 
coherent combinations of these or others. If the going moral norms 
(what we think we know morally, theoretically or on the hoof) 
successfully produce what is wanted in their respective forms of life, 
the question nonetheless remains open: is this a form of life we should 
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want? This version of naturalized moral epistemology seems to have 
no way to supply the kind of normativity involved in people’s living as 
they really ought to live. And if moral inquiry in either its philosophical 
or nonacademic versions is to retain its normative identity as an 
inquiry into what is really right or good, into how human beings get 
right how they ought to live rather than how they variously in fact do, 
it seems that moral inquiry must be something other than a purely 
scientific investigation. 
This is not to deny that empirical findings of a scientific sort 
might fulfill a part of the empirical burden of moral philosophy. Insofar 
as moral epistemology needs, as it does, to understand what people 
know in understanding how to live as they in fact do morally, to that 
extent the parallel holds. Scientific studies of several types, for 
example, might well help us understand how people come to master 
the moral concepts in use, recognize the patterns of behavior their 
extant morality requires or suppresses, and cultivate the perceptions 
and feeling responses that enable people to bring expression and 
action into morally appropriate play, both in fulfilling moral demands 
or ideals as well as in understanding the terms of deserting or defying 
them. A very important part of moral epistemology is the investigation 
of the actual conditions of moral competence of various kinds. 
Naturalized moral epistemology should be eager to reap the benefits of 
whatever scientific studies of individual capacities or group processes 
successfully explain how we are able to share a way of life and to learn 
how to live within it (which does not always consist in living in 
accordance with it).12 But this robustly empirical study, ripe with 
potential for scientific contributions, leaves us one question short of 
philosophical ethics. The missing question is: no matter how 
successfully some group of people sustain a way of life they happen to 
live, is the way they live how they ought to live? A naturalized moral 
epistemology that has been absorbed into scientific studies might give 
us the best accounts we can have of how they do it, without yet 
touching in what sense they should. 
Just here, though, there is more than one way to understand 
the normativity problem. It might seem as if the kind of knowledge 
that comes in with asking whether a given moral way of life is really 
how to live cannot be any kind of empirical knowledge, and so must 
either be knowledge of something nonempirical (“transcendent moral 
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reality,” “non-natural properties”), or nonempirical knowledge of 
something (“pure practical reason,” “the logic of moral language”). But 
these moves to transcendence or to knowledge a priori throw in the 
towel on naturalized epistemology for morality. Alternately, we might 
hold that aside from what we know about how to get around in a “local 
moral world,” there is no kind of moral knowledge left over to have. 
This idea, however, can be taken in more than one way. It can be 
taken to say that there is nothing that could be an answer to that 
“normative question.”13 Or, on the contrary, it could be a starter for 
naturalizing moral epistemology. There is no knowledge “over and 
above,” but there are further uses of the same kinds of naturally 
acquired moral knowledge we already have, together with whatever 
else about the world we think we know, to assess our and others’ 
moral beliefs and our or others’ ways of arriving at them. 
III. NATURALIZING MORAL KNOWLEDGE 
In line with this idea, now try a different naturalizing model, one that 
does not so much “extend” the naturalizing of science to ethics as take 
up the structural analogy for ethics. 
(NME2) The epistemology of moral knowledge tells us 
under what conditions we have real knowledge of how 
we ought to live. 
Moral epistemology must have a normative dimension, 
its inquiries must distinguish conditions under which we 
have genuine knowledge of how we ought to live from 
those under which we have something else (beliefs 
about how to live that are not warranted). 
Moral knowledge is one kind of knowledge about the 
world (rather than about a transcendent or non-natural 
realm). 
So, there is no kind of purely nonempirical knowledge 
that could validate moral knowledge. 
Moral knowledge is knowledge about what 
understandings of how to live are “valid” 
(true/right/acceptable/deserving of authority.) 
There is no kind of knowledge that can assess the moral 
validity of a way of life that does not include moral 
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knowledge, no knowledge of the validity of values that 
does not include evaluative knowledge. 
There is no kind of knowledge that without moral 
knowledge can be used to establish the validity of moral 
knowledge. 
So, the account of how we have real knowledge of how 
we ought to live becomes another application of moral 
knowledge, i.e. we will use our best (presumptively 
genuine but always in principle fallible and revisable) 
moral and other knowledge of how to live to explain how 
we can come to such a thing as knowledge of how to 
live. 
If we take seriously this approximation to a prototype for 
naturalizing moral knowledge, other facets of naturalized moral 
epistemology have to configure compatibly with it. 
A naturalized moral epistemology will be holistic. But if we take 
(NME2) seriously, we need to rethink what kind of holism about 
knowledge it is plausible to endorse. “The” web of belief is a powerful 
image that retains the pleasing picture of knowledge as all of one 
piece, even as it jettisons the older architectural metaphor of a single 
structure with fixed foundations. But what is the status of the idea that 
knowledge is all of one piece? Surely an a priori conviction of the 
necessity of the unity of knowledge does not comport with a 
naturalized epistemology. Furthermore, (NME2) incorporates a 
commitment to natural moral knowledge. But if moral knowledge 
introduces a kind of normativity and forms of normative question open 
to natural investigation that some other types of natural knowledge 
cannot answer or explain, then it seems that moral knowledge (and 
perhaps other types of evaluative, practical, and craft knowledge) is a 
distinct type of knowledge, and we should not suppose that methods 
of discovery or patterns of validation are simply identical to or 
continuous with ones that obtain in other contexts. Finally, the image 
of “science” is apt to play a mystifying role in these discussions: is 
there a unified theoretical web of “science”? The “unity of science” 
represents a regulative ideal invested with philosophical hopes (akin, 
interestingly, to the reduction programs whose failure Quine remarks 
in introducing of the idea of naturalizing epistemology), not the known 
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reality of a web of seamlessly interconnected theory, or even methods 
entirely homologous (much less uniform) in detail. 
So it seems we have not enough reason to affirm a single web 
of belief, and some reasons not to. I suggest that a naturalized moral 
epistemology should opt for a contextual holism about knowledge. 
Instead of the view that every belief in the web is linked by some 
connections to all others, contextual holism would affirm only what we 
know: every belief is linked in some network of beliefs to indefinitely 
many others, including to normative standards that may be context-
specific.14 How and to what extent “webs” of belief overlap or 
intermesh is itself open to inquiry. Whether the “web” idea with its 
pleasing connotations of lithe transparency, springy flexibility, and 
tensile strength is apt for imaging the organization of our knowledges 
is to be explored. There is something after all very “unpragmatic,” in 
its way, about Quine’s web: it pictures a tissue of belief holistically 
hovering outside diverse action-repertoires, practices, relations, 
techniques and institutions that are involved in making available and 
vetting the status of beliefs. Open-ended contextual holism neither 
seals “morality” and “science” off from each other as separate 
language games nor preemptively unifies moral and scientific belief 
into a single field. 
Of course, one approach to naturalism in ethics tries to preserve 
the autonomy of morality precisely by getting it out of the way of the 
secure path of science, lest it be “secured” (as in (NME1)) by the 
disappearance of ethics as a normative inquiry.15 This can be done by 
making morality something natural that is other than knowledge. In 
this category come noncognitivist and expressivist views. I sympathize 
with this move in that I think it a distortion to picture morality as only, 
essentially, or even primarily a matter of knowledge. This slights the 
complex economy of feelings and the expressive and directive aspects 
of our moral practice and discourse. But I consider ethics as pursuing 
an understanding of morality, which provides understandings of 
ourselves as bearers of responsibilities in the service of values. 
STOPPED HERE 
Instead, I reject two equations. One is the identification of Anatural@ 
or Aempirical@ knowledge exclusively with what can be known from 
within the world about the ways the world in fact is. The other is the 
equation of knowledge about how the world in fact is with scientific 
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knowledge of the world. We sometimes know from within the world 
how the world might or could be for us, that is, how the world could be 
better or worse for us in some ways. Indeed, our knowing this is a 
condition for our understanding many ideas basic to morality, such as 
cruelty, suffering, and humiliation, or dignity, gratitude, and trust, and 
for identifying the states and relations these ideas represent. It is also 
true that much of our understanding of how the world in fact is and 
could be is available not only through common sense knowledge, but 
through refined and methodic inquiries that are not scientific, or are of 
the more dubiously scientific sorts. Humanistic and critical disciplines, 
like history, philosophy, critical social theory, historical and 
critical studies of scientific practice, institutional genealogies, 
literature, literary studies, cultural studies, and semiotics, as well as in 
those scientifically lower-ranking social sciences and their still lower 
ranking parts, such as social psychology, sociological theory, 
ethnography, and their like, illuminate ways people live and how these 
ways are understood by those who live them. In sum, for moral 
knowledge and its improvement we must always use some of what we 
know about the world, and some of what we know that bears most 
crucially on moral knowledge and its refinement is not scientific 
knowledge. For a suitably generous naturalism, we and our 
experiences of the world and each other are in the world; how our 
world is, could be, and would be better or worse are among the things 
we can know from within our world about it. 
In casting off global holism and scientifically regimented naturalism, I 
have pulled out the main struts of a Ascientism@ that can prop up 
some visions of naturalizing epistemology. Scientism is not (any) 
science, but an ideological vision of the cultural role and human 
significance of scientific knowledges. AScientism@ is a vision of a 
mythicized entity Ascience@ as the ultimate source of valid answers to 
anything worth knowing and the tribunal of what could possibly be 
taken seriously as a question. Scientism is really a full blown 
normative view; it is an ethics and a politics, not exclusively of 
knowledge, but inevitably of culture, authority, and society. That, 
however, is not something wrong with it. What=s wrong with it is its 
spurious regimentation of scientific practices into mythic Ascience,@ 
and it=s a priori imposition of incontestable and preemptive closure on 
our pursuits of understanding. What renders scientism ideological is its 
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obscuring the variety, complexity, and fallibility of scientific practice, 
its claiming strictly universal (and necessary?) dominion in the realm 
of knowledge, and its borrowing the mantle of Ascientific objectivity@ 
when it is itself not science. Scientific inquiries 
22 
don=t need scientism. And naturalized epistemology should avoid the 
embarrassing irony of putting Ascience@ in the place of an 
incontestable and universal epistemic tribunal, which was exactly what 
classical epistemology is usually understood to have hoped itself to be. 
It will be necessary to repeat: I am not criticizing scientific inquiries or 
saying that scientific method is an ideology. It is scientism, not 
science, that has no place in a fallibilist and naturalized approach to 
epistemology. 
Freed from confining and reductive pictures of knowledge, it becomes 
easier to acknowledge what is essential to a naturalist and naturalized 
knowledge of morality. Moral knowledge needs all the reliable and 
useful empirical information of any type that itBor rather weBcan get. 
Part of the point of seeing morality naturalistically is to dig into the 
idea that there is no prior restriction on what we could come to know 
about ourselves in our world that might not have implications for our 
beliefs about how to live. By the same token, moral knowledge is as 
open-ended, revisable, and ultimately fallible as any other kinds of 
natural knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, we use what we know, and 
accept that we are likely at any time to be wrong about something. 
And we must rest on some presumptive knowledge in order to 
examine where knowledge itself comes from, while this very 
examination may reveal that what we thought was knowledge was not 
what it appeared. A naturalized epistemology needs to be freewheeling 
and fallibilist, which is to say open to the best and most contextually 
useful fruits of all inquiries and experiences. And the naturalized 
epistemology of morality, in particular, seeks an understanding of 
moral knowledge that is necessarily both epistemically and morally 
reflexive. 
IV. NORMATIVE QUESTIONS 
What now of that Anormative question,@ not a question of simply 
explaining the causes, 
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organization, and effects of any individuals= or communities= moral 
behavior, but a question of establishing whether we must or should do 
what our going morality demands? This is a question about morality=s 
authority, not merely its de facto power but its rightful dominion over 
us. It is easy to start thinking that Athe normative question@ is one 
big jackpot question about Aall@ morality that arises from some 
reflective standpoint outside of or beyond morality. It can seem as if 
this is a sort of super-question that requires a sort of super-answer, 
that is, an answer to the question AIs it really right (obligatory, good, 
etc.)?@ that is of a different order from answers to those garden 
variety questions of Amust I really...?@ and Awould it really be wrong 
to...?@ or Ahow much does it really matter if I...?@that arise about 
different matters and at different levels of generality in people=s lives. 
I suspect that the idea that there is a separate, external question 
about morality=s authority is rooted deeply in non-naturalist, and 
perhaps supernaturalist, thinking about morality that yearns for its 
validation by something Ahigher,@ be that God, human nature, the 
natural law, pure practical reason, or perhaps Ascience.@ Even 
theories of ethics that understand it as a human construction, like a 
procedure, or a contract, or a discursive situation, still often think that 
the construction that could answer the normative question must be an 
ideal construction. This is the idea that nothing any group of people is 
doing at a place at a time isBindeed, could possibly beBour touchstone 
in ethics when we ask whether a way to live really has authority. 
But there cannot be just one normative question. For one has to stand 
on some part of morality to pose a normative query about some other; 
and there is always at least the possibility (although it is not 
inevitable) that the moral judgment on which one stood for those 
purposes at that time might come in question at some other. AThe@ 
normative question is not one question, 
24 
but a kind of question that recurs applied to different matters or 
reapplied to earlier answers. And there is no way for it to be posed 
Aoutside@ some moral assumptions or other. 
The situation is no different for moral theorists. As naturalists, we do 
not hesitate to look at the facts about the formation of moral beliefs. 
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The fact is that what and how we can think about morality depends on 
what we have learned in the context of our places within particular 
ways of life, questions within them, and perhaps comparisons between 
them and others ways more or less comparable. In fact, then, 
Areflection,@ in moral philosophy or outside it, is on or of, or better 
from, some bits of (putative) moral knowledge, some already familiar 
forms of moral reasoning, some extant norms of responsibility, that 
allow us to know that it is morality, what is right and good, that we are 
thinking about here. Moreover, a large mass of critical work in late 
twentieth century maps the deliverances of Areflection@ in moral 
philosophy onto specific locations in a given social field: moral 
theorizing Areflects@ characteristic roles, expectations, and life-
experiences or the absence of experiences that track race, education, 
national culture, religious heritage and practice, economic status, 
gender, age, sexuality, physical ability and other factors that account 
for different social worlds or very different experiences within the 
same social world.16 
16 See Walker, Moral Understandings, especially Chapter 1-3 for a 
critique of epistemic placelessness and lack of reflexivity in moral 
theorizing, as well as structural and historical analysis of the 
emergence of the Atheoretical-juridical model@ of compact theory, 
See also Chapters 1 and 3 for examination of the feminist critique of 
gender and other bias in moral theorizing. 
25 
Better to recognize going in that actual moral ideas, practices, norms, 
patterns of reasoning, and paradigmatic judgments are in fact always 
in play in moral philosophy at the outset. The philosopher no more 
asks after the moral authority of Amorality@ from outside of it than 
does anyone reflecting on moral demands when the garden variety 
questions work their way to the surface out of confusion, temptation, 
longing, or ennui. The moral philosopher may be more relentless, 
more systematic, and more logically acute in pursuing normative 
questions. She may invent in thought startlingly simple or idealized or 
schematic moral views the social realization of which may or may not 
be determinate, available, or habitable in reality; this, too, may have 
its uses. But in all cases of moral reflection, she starts where we all 
do: we start from here, for some Awe,@ and some Ahere.@ 
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In moral theorizing, as at other times, we resort in all cases to what 
Christine Korsgaard calls Areflective endorsement.@17 If we are able 
to endorse morality once we understand what about us and world, 
especially our actual social world, grounds and enables the morality we 
have, or if we can endorse a change based on the comparison between 
what we have and what we might, based on these same 
understandings, then this justifies the extant or revised morality=s 
17 Korsgaard=s initially naturalistic treatment of Areflective 
endorsement@ as the way to answer the normative question unfolds 
into a argument for the universality and necessity of our valuing our 
humanity as a condition for acting on reasons, hence bringing back in 
a bit of the old apriori when it comes to securing morality. This view 
makes for interesting comparison with the naturalized version of 
reflective endorsement of actual ways of living. See Korsgaard, The 
Sources of Normativity, Lectures 2 and 3. 
26 
authority, its Anormativity.@ Reflection can thus produce or sustain, 
as it can defeat or chasten, confidence in the claims morality makes on 
us. But we can only test our moral views by finding them good or not 
upon reflective examination. So the normative question requires the 
application of some morally normative standards or judgments in the 
vetting of others. 
What results when some of our moral practices, judgments, or 
concepts pass moral review, is that our confidence in aspects of ways 
we live is confirmed or perhaps enlivened; when they fail it is 
weakened or destroyed. But it is not as if there are our moral beliefs 
and our (always in part moral) reasons for them, and then there is our 
Aconfidence@ in them, the way a cherry sits on a sundae. 
AConfidence@ is not something we might have or not have about 
those standards we hold as moral ones. When we hold some ways we 
in fact live as Ahow to live,@ i.e. the right or better founded or more 
enlightened ways, this way of holding certain standards marks them as 
morally authoritative ones. When confidence wanes or is damaged, we 
are inclined to wonder whether the standards we have held as moral 
ones are in fact standards of some other kind (for example, etiquette 
or mores) or whether we have held the wrong moral standards. So, 
too, confidence does not replace knowing what is right or good; it is 
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confidence in our knowing at least some of, or approximately, what is 
right or good. Our standards and judgments (or some specially central 
or important ones of them) being, literally for all we know, valid 
constitutes the moral authority of morality, whatever other powers of 
de facto social authority and inertial social practice hold the standards 
and supporting practices in place.18 
18 Compare Bernard Williams=s somewhat elusive appeals to 
Aconfidence@ in Bernard Williams, Ethics and The Limits of 
Philosophy, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
27 
1985), 170-3. See also J. E. J. Altham, AReflection and confidence,@ 
in World, mind, and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of 
Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Williams, AReplies@ in the 
same volume. While Williams seems to consider confidence an 
alternative to knowledge, I see our confidence as a kind of trust in 
what we know. 
28 
Naturalized epistemology of science needs to investigate belief-
producing cognitive, social, and institutional processes with an eye to 
uncovering whether or not they are conducive to the kinds of truth the 
sciences seek, and in doing so uses with confidence what it seems 
most reasonable to think we already know.19 Moral epistemology, 
whether practiced systematically by philosophers or in the event by 
any thoughtful agent, needs to investigate belief-producing cognitive, 
social, and institutional processes with an eye to uncovering whether 
or not they are conducive to the kinds of worth upon which a moral 
form of life rests its authority or in terms of which its authority is 
understood. But Aworth@ here is a dummy expression for some form 
of value or necessity that will not be identifiable independently of some 
standards of moral judgment already in hand. Indeed, we can not so 
much as characterize what our or someone else=s form of moral life is 
without importing some understandings of what to identify as the 
moral parts, and in what sort of evaluative language to identify them. 
Wherever we invoke some moral concepts, standards, and judgments 
to test whether some others Areally@ have the authority they purport, 
the ones we invoke are invested with our confidence in their 
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representing what we (already) reasonably understand to matter 
morally. This does not prevent the very commitments in which we 
have reposed confidence from becoming objects of critical reflection in 
their turn. 
An open-minded and empirically robust naturalism about morality 
readily discovers that morality is not socially modular: moral 
understandings are (indeed must be) effected through social 
arrangements, while social arrangement include moral practices as 
working parts. Our concepts and principles are given meaning by the 
practices they in turn make sense of. For this 
19 See Kornblith, AA Conservative Appproach to Social 
Epistemology,@ 102ff. 
29 
reason there is not nor could there have been a Apure core@ of moral 
knowledge completely extricable from some actual social world or 
other.20 That is why moral knowledge requires extensive empirical 
inquiry and intensive reflexivity about both the moral and non-moral 
conditions under which we believe we know how to live. 
A central mode of examination of our moral understandings is 
Atransparency testing,@ which involves both moral and epistemic 
aspects.21 We need to ask whether we in fact know how it is we do 
live in our moral-social worlds. In fact, in most societies, Awe@ do not 
all live the same lives, and Awe@ often fail to understand or do not try 
to understand how the places our moral-social worlds provide for us 
are the conditions for the very different places of others of us. Our 
intermeshed moral and social understandings may be incomplete, self-
serving, distorting, or rigged; they may render the lives of some of us 
morally invisible, incoherent, or diminished. The moral values we 
Ashare@ may be ones we do not equally freely endorse or enjoy. We 
need to 
20 See Walker, Moral Understandings, Chapters 2, 3, and 9 on the 
genealogy and implications of the Apure core@ idea. 
21 The idea of Atransparency@ as an ideal of moral views or social 
orders appear in Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 101-10, 
and Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, 17. Although she does not use 
the phrase, I have profited most from Annette Baier=s application of 
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what she calls a Aminimal condition of adequacy@ that a moral view 
Anot have to condemn the conditions needed for its own thriving,@ 
that it not fail to acknowledge or deny acknowledgment to that which 
is a condition of its working as it does. See Baier, Moral Prejudices, 96. 
30 
discover whether what are represented as morally authoritative 
understandings are ones whose authority is or is not really earned by 
their being shown answerable to well-founded fact and critically tested 
moral standards. We need to explore whether practices that purport to 
embody values, standards, and judgments Awe@ share and in which 
Awe@ trust are really driven and reproduced by coercion, deception, 
manipulation, or violence directed at some of us by others. Where 
transparency testing of our actual lifeways does not sustain confidence 
that Awe@ know either how we do live or how to live, the 
understandings in play lose their moral authority. Then we really are 
left with mere customs, habits, or mores; with ways some people in 
fact live that are no longer credible as Ahow to live.@ But to discover 
whether authority is warranted and confidence is in point, we must 
bring to bear a lot of, and the most relevant and reliable, information 
we have about morality and society. This is especially so in moral 
theorizing and moral epistemology, where we are promised a high 
degree of sophisticated scrutiny of the tenability of moral 
conceptions.22 
V. WHAT DO AWE@ KNOW BEST? 
I have argued against a purely scientific naturalism, or a scientifically 
insupportable Ascientism,@ lest we claim prematurely or irresponsibly 
for scientific theories or findings a relevance to morality that they do 
not have, or that we do not know they have. A different danger 
22 The thorough intermeshing of moral and epistemic considerations 
in the reciprocal relationship between understanding who we are, how 
we live, and how to live, might be a very rich case of what Richmond 
Campbell calls Afact-value holism.@ See Campbell, Illusions of 
Paradox, Chapter 7. 
31 
for naturalists, and perhaps a greater, is that preoccupation with 
science as our best empirical knowledge can turn our attention away 
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from other kinds of inquiry that bear deeply and directly on our 
understandings of how we live and how to live. Between the Scylla of 
scientific naturalism about morality, and the Charybdis of a 
transcendent moral reality accessible to Apure@ reflection, lies a great 
deal we can and already do know about our social worlds and moral 
theories and traditions that is crucial for testing our moral 
understandings. Above I mentioned humanistic disciplines, critical 
studies, and the methodologically less rigorous parts of social and 
political theory and sciences as important resources for moral 
reflection, that is, for reflection on actual forms of life that claim moral 
authority for those who live them (and perhaps beyond). Some 
contemporary philosophical theorizing itself, empirically attentive and 
reflexively critical about its empirical burdens and moral commitments, 
offers moral reflection and moral theory materials it cannot honestly 
proceed without. 
I am going to use here, very briefly, a single example of such 
empirically enriched but normatively motivated work that sharply 
focuses a point about the kinds of things moral philosophy needs to 
examine and who is likely to want to find them out. Charles W. Mills=s 
The Racial Contract constructs a deliberately stylized theoretical model 
to foreground both Athe most important political system of recent 
global historyBthe system of domination by which white people have 
historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule 
over nonwhite people;@ the invisibility of this system and the issues it 
raises in mainstream ethics and political philosophy; the obscurity to, 
or outright denial of, this system by most white people; 
32 
and the intimate relations among these.23 Specifically, Mills argues 
that the tradition of social contract theory, still a hugely influential 
tributary of modern Euro-American moral and political theory, cannot 
be understood in its normative implications and historical reference 
without seeing the broad and deep Racial ContractBa set of 
interlocking political, moral, and epistemological assumptions and their 
effectsBthat underwrites it.24 Mills, in effect, proposes that if 
contractarian models are honored devices in philosophy for exposing 
the logic of liberal political legitimacy, we ought to consider their 
potential for diagnosing the logic of politically legitimated racism in 
liberal polities. More broadly, Mills asks us to try examining the 
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apparent contradiction of modern European moral philosophy as such: 
A...an antipatriarchalist Enlightenment liberalism, with its 
proclamations of equal rights, autonomy, and freedom of all 
23 Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 1; hereafter cited as RC in the text. 
24 Among the facets of the Racial Contract Mills connects with the 
massive and grim historical record are: a Apartitioned social 
ontology@ and juridical elaboration of persons and racial subpersons 
(14); a racial polity that is obligated to the privilege of necessarily 
white citizens at the expense of nonwhites (12); a racialized 
geography that placed most human beings in a irremediable state of 
nature (13), their lives uncounted (49-50) and their lands unpeopled 
(49); an Aepistemology of ignorance@ that precludes understanding of 
social and political realities (18), produces Amoral cognitive 
distortions@ (95) and disqualifies cognition or cultural production of 
non-Europeans (44). 
33 
men, thus took place simultaneously with the massacre, expropriation, 
and subjection to hereditary slavery of men at least apparently 
human@ (RC, 64). 
In what he describes as a Anaturalized@ ethical account, Mills makes 
use of the large and expanding body of historical, demographic, 
anthropological, and critical studies of race, colonialism, modern 
European history, economic development, and exploitation of non-
European lands and peoples. He also pays critical attention to aspects 
of philosophy=s own history and to specific texts that have been 
passed over silently or left out of sight in perpetuating a particular 
version of a canonical history of philosophy. Mills=s project is not a 
grand unified explanatory theory but a morally and epistemically 
strategic intervention, a Arhetorical trope and theoretical method@ 
(RC, 6) for reorganizing perceptions of fact and by doing so posing 
questions about what theories and professional discourses of moral 
and political philosophy have seemed interested or uninterested in 
knowing about our world. If one looks where he does determinedly 
enough, it becomes a good deal harder to think, or not to think about, 
some things. It becomes harder to think that Kant and other modern 
European thinkers created visions of an ideal moral polity and merely 
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failed, due to lamentable but local prejudice, to imagine certain people 
within it. Mills makes a compelling case by direct textual and inductive 
historical evidence that it was integral to the construction of that ideal 
polity that certain people be imagined outside it. One is dignified not 
only by what one is, but by what, or rather whom, one is not.25 
25 For a primer of short and disturbing selections that exhibit the 
modern construction of race within Enlightenment terms by 
Enlightenment thinkers, see Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., Race and 
the Enlightenment: A Reader (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 
1997). Two 
34 
sobering historical studies that document the enormous energy and 
evasion needed by Europeans to avoid the simplest path of taking 
Africans or indigenous people as simply other human beings who lived 
differently, even exotically differently, from Europeans are Olive 
Dickason=s study of early North American colonization in the 
Northeast, The Myth of the Savage: And the Beginnings of French 
Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton: The University of Alberta 
Press, 1984, 1987), and Winthrop D. Jordan=s White Over Black: 
American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1968). 
35 
An ostensibly Auniversalist@ tradition of ethical thinking about 
Aman,@ Ahuman nature,@ and Ahumanity@ in Western philosophy, 
from ancient to contemporary times, has in fact consistently been 
understood and intended not to apply to the majority of humankind, 
female and nonwhite. Yet is seems to depend on who moral theorists 
are, and on to whom they give their accounts and are accountable, 
whether they will question the significance of this. The ostensible 
universalism of most contemporary moral philosophy and the 
bowdlerized universalist presentation of its history conceals the actual 
history in which the enunciation of Auniversal@ truths has not only 
coexisted with but has served persisting social practices of dividing, 
excluding, stratifying, subordinating, degrading, and dehumanizing the 
larger part of humankind. Most moral philosophers continue to import 
assumptions about the uniformity of moral intuitions, standard 
conditions of responsibility, or the universal recognizability of 
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Acommon humanity,@ in a way that disguises the ways moral 
perceptions are characteristically formed in societies in which social 
and moral differentiation is nearly universally the rule.26 Do we know 
26 The importance for moral philosophy of recognizing, not ignoring or 
obscuring, the pervasive fact of differentiated social-moral positions in 
human societies is a main theme of Moral Understandings. I have 
elsewhere examined several philosophers= arguments that 
presuppose, while purporting to prove, that recognizing the Acommon 
humanity@ of other human beings is in some sense unavoidable. 
Sadly, it has been and continues to be avoided in numerous forms 
more often than not by human beings. See Margaret Urban Walker, 
AIneluctable Feelings and Moral Recognition,@ in Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, Volume XXII: The Philosophy of Emotions, ed. Peter A. 
French and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of 
Notre 
36 
whether our systems of moral philosophy even now are free of 
conceptual features or substantive assumptions that continue the 
actual tradition and the understandings it has in fact required? Do we 
routinely and methodically make sure that we use what we know to 
find out? Do Awe@ really know more about the evolution of social 
cooperation than about recent histories and ongoing dynamics of social 
subordination or imperialism? Or do these questions not seem 
important enough, or philosophical enough, for Aus@ to address? It 
depends on who we are. 
In fact, it is overwhelmingly women who have explored the sexism of 
ethical theory; people of color, ethnically marginalized people, or 
indigenous people who have insisted that we know about racism or 
colonialism; gay, lesbian, and transsexual theorists who ask us review 
the moral intuitions of a hetero-normative cultural universe critically. 
Not all of Aus@ know what others do, and not all of us try to, or care 
to. 
Louise Antony says naturalizing knowledge Arequires us to give up the 
idea that our own epistemic practice is transparent to us...@27 So too 
for our moral practice, and the epistemic practice, moral philosophy, 
that seeks to know it, from within it. In moral epistemology, we cannot 
but ask ourselves what we know best about science, morality, and 
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social life, and how we know it. Yet here it is epistemically and morally 
urgent that we open the question that Moore 
Dame Press, 1998). 
27 Louise M. Antony, AQuine as Feminist,@ in A Mind of One=s Own: 
Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, ed. Louise M. Antony and 
Charlotte Witt (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 202. 
37 
would never have asked: who are Awe@? And how, in point of fact, do 
we know that?28 
28 I thank John Greco, Richmond Campbell, and Bruce Hunter for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. An opportunity to present a 
shorter version of this paper in a symposium on naturalized moral 
epistemology at the Canadian Philosophical Association in Edmonton, 
May, 2000, helped me to rethink the final form of this essay. I thank 
the CPA for this invitation. 
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